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Abstract  
This paper uses Social Security earnings records linked to data from the Health and Retire-
ment Study to examine the labor market behavior of rejected and accepted disability appli-
cants prior to their application. We find that rejected applicants have substantially lower 
earnings and labor force participation rates during the decade prior to application than 
beneficiaries. Also, we find some evidence of a divergence between these groups, with re-
jected applicants leaving the labor force at a faster rate than beneficiaries as their appli-
cation date approaches. One interpretation of these results is that the disability screening 
process on average separates those who are at least partially motivated by adverse eco-
nomic circumstances when applying for disability benefits from other applicants. 
Keywords: Social Security, disability insurance, disability screening process 
Introduction 
Applications to United States federal disability programs have grown con-
siderably in recent decades. In 2005, over 2.12 million individuals applied for 
benefits from the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program (Social Se-
curity Administration 2006); the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program re-
ceived nearly a 1.1 million new applications for benefits from working age adults 
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(Brooks 2007). For DI, this is over five times the number of applications in 1960 
and almost twice the 1990 figure. 
In addition to the burdens that the rise in DI applications placed on the screen-
ing process, it has also resulted in rapid growth of the program, both in terms of 
expenditures and beneficiaries. After stabilizing through much of the 1980s, the 
number of working age beneficiaries has more than doubled since 1990 (from 3 
million to 6.5 million in 2005). Payments to working age beneficiaries were $85.4 
billion in 2005 and continue to grow faster than inflation. Autor and Duggan 
(2006) argue that changes to the DI screening process are a key factor contribut-
ing to the program’s rapid growth. They point to 1984 reforms and subsequent 
changes that liberalized the eligibility criteria for DI by expanding the number of 
qualifying conditions to include some that are difficult to authenticate (such as 
back pain and mental illness) and by amending the rules of evidence so that they 
became more favorable to applicants.1 In addition, they point to increases in the 
replacement rate (i.e., the ratio of potential benefits to earnings) for low-skilled 
workers as another driving factor. These two factors are interrelated. The reform 
gave workers more discretion as to whether to shift onto the DI rolls, while the 
rising replacement rate (for low-skilled workers) gave them an increasing incen-
tive to do so. 
The Social Security Administration (SSA) must process DI applications to de-
termine if applicants meet the work and health requirements of the programs. In-
dividuals must demonstrate in their applications that they have a health condi-
tion that is severe enough to prevent them from performing market work for at 
least 1 year. Evaluating these claims is expensive. The costs to SSA of administer-
ing the DI program ($2.32 billion) were over 78% as high in 2005 as SSA’s costs 
for administering the much larger old-age and survivors program ($2.96 billion). 
In fact, when scaled by benefits paid, administrative costs are 3.9 times greater 
for the DI program (2.7% of benefits) than for the old age and survivors program 
(0.7% of benefits). 
Despite the large resources used to evaluate these disability applications, ap-
plicants often express a great deal of dissatisfaction with the screening process. 
Much of this dissatisfaction arises because of the high denial rate of applications. 
In 2005, nearly 1.3 million (or nearly 61% of) applications for DI were denied by 
SSA. In recent decades, denial rates have averaged 55%; over that time, an av-
erage of three-quarters of one million individuals have been denied DI benefits 
each year. Denial rates of SSI applications over this time period have been even 
higher. Denied disability applicants can either drop their claims to disability ben-
efits, or embark on a long and potentially costly appeals process. 
Because of the uncertainty in accurately determining an applicant’s work ca-
pacity, there is disagreement about whether SSA successfully identifies whether 
applicants meet the health standards for receipt of disability benefits. Some la-
ment that the process is too strict and that many denied applicants are deserving 
of benefits, while others argue that the screen is too lax and that many who are ca-
pable of working abuse the program. In any event, Autor and Duggan (2006) con-
1. The 1984 reforms represent a classic tradeoff between Type I and Type II error. The reform lowered 
Type I error, the likelihood of rejecting applicants who are truly disabled at the expense of Type II 
error, the likelihood of accepting applicants who should not qualify.    
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clude that the system is “broken” and in need of reform. They argue that changes 
to the screening process since 1984 have turned the program into “a nonemploy-
ability insurance program for a subset of beneficiaries.”  
Little work has been done investigating the characteristics of denied and ac-
cepted disability applicants in order to help determine the efficacy of SSA screen-
ing process. This paper examines the pre-application labor market histories of ac-
cepted and rejected DI and SSI applicants. Administrative earnings records from 
the Health and Retirement Study are used to measure the trends in work behav-
ior of these groups in the years leading up to a disability application. 
We find considerable differences in the labor force behavior of rejected and 
accepted male disability applicants in the years leading up to application. After 
controlling for observable demographic and health characteristics, rejected appli-
cants have substantially lower earnings and labor force participation rates prior 
to application. On average, the labor force participation rate of denied applicants 
is about 10% lower before application than for similar beneficiaries. For a group 
who are primarily DI applicants (some are applying for SSI disability benefits), 
there is evidence of a divergence between the rejected applicants and beneficia-
ries as the application date approaches. Rejected applicants earn on average 8.5% 
less than beneficiaries 6 years prior to application, but almost 22% less just prior 
to application. 
Our analysis suggests that rejected and accepted disability applicants have dif-
ferent labor market experiences prior to application, with the rejected applicants 
performing worse economically. This finding is consistent with a couple of sce-
narios. First, the SSA screening process might be perverse in that healthier appli-
cants (who were able to work considerably in the years before application) are 
granted benefits and less healthy applicants (who were unable to work much be-
fore application) are denied. 
A more plausible scenario is that SSA screening process on average separates 
those who are at least partially motivated by economic considerations when ap-
plying for disability benefits from other applicants. For a worker who has expe-
rienced a severe negative employment shock, for example a layoff or a decline 
in wages because he or she works in a declining industry, disability benefit ap-
plication might be attractive even if the worker’s health problems do not com-
pletely preclude employment. Studies such as Black et al. (2002), Autor and Dug-
gan (2003), Duggan and Imberman (2008) and von Wachter et al. (forthcoming) 
find that disability application decisions are sensitive to economic circumstances. 
Geographic areas and groups that experience large declines in market opportu-
nities are more likely to apply for benefits. Our findings show that, among appli-
cants for disability benefits, rejection rates are higher for those whose earnings 
and labor force participation declines more sharply in the years leading up to ap-
plication. While we do not have data on geographic or industry shocks, our ev-
idence is consistent with findings in the literature that that disability applicants 
are motivated by adverse employment shocks. While economic circumstances 
may be an important factor in the application decision, this paper leaves the work 
disincentive effects of the DI program an open question.2 
2. For example, even if DI induces able-bodied people to apply for benefits, it does not necessarily im-
ply that these people would remain in the labor force absent DI. 
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Institutional Background 
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) provide cash assistance to people who are unable to work because of health 
problems.3 DI was added to Social Security in 1957 and protects workers un-
der age 65 who are unable “to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of 
physical or mental impairment” for a period determined to last at least 12 months 
or until death. SSI was begun in 1974 in order to provide assistance to those who 
do not meet the work requirements for DI; it covers children, the aged, as well 
as working age adults. DI is an insurance system for workers; whereas, SSI is a 
means-tested welfare program. In order to qualify for DI, individuals must pay 
into the system (via the FICA tax) for a specified number of quarters, depending 
on age. SSI provides benefits to the disabled but, in place of work histories, re-
quires recipients to earn below the Federal Benefit Rate4 and have assets of less 
than $2000 for individuals and $3000 for couples. 
Both programs are large both as measured by the number of recipients and 
overall annual expenditures. In 2005, DI had 8.3 million beneficiaries receiving 
$85.4 billion in benefits; SSI paid nearly $23.1 billion in benefits to 4.1 million 
working age adults. DI benefit calculations are made just as they are for Social Se-
curity’s retirement program, except that benefits are not actuarially reduced as 
they are for individuals retiring before age 65. SSI benefits are generally lower, 
but vary depending on state supplementation. 
The application processes for DI and SSI are very similar. In order to receive 
DI, applicants must be out of the labor force for a minimum of 5 months. For SSI, 
the earnings limit effectively rules out more than nominal labor market activity. 
Application decisions for both programs are based on the review of the appli-
cant’s medical conditions by state boards. Both programs use the same health cri-
teria; in order to qualify, an individual must have a condition that prevents him 
from working anywhere in the economy. The programs make no allowance for 
being “partially” disabled. Denied applicants have a number of appeals options. 
First, to the state agency and then to an Administrative Law Judge who is inde-
pendent of the state boards. Should these options fail, the next step is to the SSA 
Appeals Council and finally to the Federal courts. Many initially rejected appli-
cants are eventually accepted on appeal. 
While much research has focused on disability beneficiaries and their poten-
tial for work, there is a small but growing literature on rejected applicants and 
the disability screening process.5 Some work has attempted to evaluate the qual-
ity of the SSA screening process. For example, Nagi (1969) and Smith and Lilien-
feld (1971) find that reconsideration of SSA disability decisions by either the same 
state board 1 year later or a separate team of medical experts reveal substantial 
Type I and Type II errors. These studies find that as many as 20% of all denials 
and an equivalent number of allowances would be reversed by another evalua-
4 In 2006, the Federal Benefit Rate was $603 for individuals and $904 for couples. 
5 See Bound and Burkhauser (1999) for a review of the literature on government disability programs. 
3 Another important benefit to disability recipients is medical insurance. DI recipients are automat-
ically enrolled in Medicare after being in the program for 2 years. SSI recipients are generally en-
rolled in Medicaid immediately.  
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tion. Gruber and Kubik (1997) examine the dramatic increase in DI rejection rates 
in the late 1970s. They find that the increasing stringency resulted in greater labor 
force participation for 45–64 year old males, with increases that were much larger 
for those who appeared to be more able. Other work has measured the health and 
demographic characteristics that are associated with disability program applica-
tion, appeals and awards. See, for example, Lahiri et al. (1995), Benitez-Silva et al. 
(1999) and Kreider and Riphahn (1999).  
 Bound (1989) and Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) both use survey data to 
compare the health and economic behavior of rejected and accepted DI applicants. 
Additionally, von Wachter et al. (forthcoming) examine similar questions using ad-
ministrative Social Security records. Bound examines applicants from the 1970s, 
while Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) focus primarily on the 1990s.6 At the time of 
the surveys, rejected applicants were employed at less than one-half the rate of the 
overall population. Bound believes that rejected DI applicants are in at least some-
what better health than accepted applicants. He uses the work behavior of these re-
jected applicants as a proxy (or an upper bound) for what the behavior of accepted 
applicants would have been had no DI program existed. Because rejected appli-
cants are for the most part not working, he concludes that an even smaller percent-
age of accepted applicants would be working had no DI program been in place, as-
suming that beneficiaries are in worse health than rejected DI applicants.7 
Others have argued that despite being in better health, the behavior of rejected 
applicants may actually understate the counterfactual behavior of accepted appli-
cants. Chen and van der Klaauw write that “rejected applicants and beneficiaries 
may on average differ not only in their average health but also in other character-
istics, such as their average pre-application earnings, work histories, age and ed-
ucation level. Moreover, they may differ in their preferences for working.” They 
also note Parsons’ (1991) contention that the application process may lower la-
bor force participation even for rejected applicants, since many of these people 
may stay out of the labor force in order to appeal their decision or to reapply. 
Additionally, not working during the application process may reduce applicants’ 
earnings opportunities, thus also lowering their labor force participation rate. 
Chen and van der Klaauw report statistically significant demographic differ-
ences between rejected and accepted applicants, suggesting that the behavior of 
rejected applicants may not be an upper bound for the counterfactual behavior of 
accepted applicants. For example, rejected applicants are more likely female and 
non-white, characteristics that are often correlated with weaker attachment to the 
labor force. However, despite these differences, Chen and van der Klaauw con-
clude that Bound’s approach likely provides a reasonable upper bound for the 
counterfactual behavior of accepted applicants. Using a sophisticated approach 
that controls for differences between rejected and accepted applicants, they es-
timate that DI reduces the labor supply of beneficiaries by 20 percentage points 
versus an estimated 15 percentage points when employing Bounds’ technique. 
Nonetheless, estimates from both approaches suggest that most accepted appli-
cants would not be working, even if DI did not exist.  
6 .While Bound (and most other studies) focuses on male applicants, Chen and van der Klaauw in-
clude both male and female applicants in their analysis. 
7. See Parsons (1991) and Bound (1991) for a debate about the reliability of this empirical strategy.  
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 Von Wachter et al. (forthcoming) generally confirm that Bound’s findings for 
older DI applicants holds for their data spanning from 1978 to 2004. They report 
that earnings for applicants (and especially rejected applicants) have declined 
over time when compared to non-applicants. Additionally, they find that rejected 
applicants are more likely to have spells where they are not employed (or have 
drops in earnings), whereas accepted applicants have more stable earnings histo-
ries, with a sharp decline in the year before applying to DI.8 
Data 
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is comprised of data on 7,702 United 
States households whose primary respondent was between ages 51 and 61 in 
1992, when the first survey was conducted. Subsequent surveys have been car-
ried out every other year since the initial 1992 wave. In addition to economic vari-
ables, the HRS includes detailed information on family structure, health, and geo-
graphic information on the household head and spouse’s parents, children, and 
siblings. Important variables from the HRS used in this paper include the date of 
disability application (for either DI or SSI), as well as a number of demographic 
characteristics such as education, age, race, marital histories, and gender. The 
most important feature of the HRS data for our work is the ability to link respon-
dents to administrative earnings records from the SSA.9 The records include cov-
ered earnings under Social Security for the years 1951 through 1991. 
In each wave of the HRS, individuals are asked not only about their health, but 
also whether they have applied for DI or SSI since the previous interview date. 
Additionally, for the first interview date (1992), individuals are asked if they have 
ever applied to either program. Questions are then asked as to the date and out-
come of the application. Initially denied applicants are asked whether they ap-
pealed their decision or reapplied to the program. For those who applied for a 
disability program, we match the health, demographic and application informa-
tion with the Social Security administrative earnings records in order to create a 
panel with the applicant’s labor market participation and earnings observations 
for each of the 10 years leading up to his application. 
The resulting data set contains 489 males with applications through 1992.10 
(By contrast, there are 4,328 males with earnings records but no applications.) Of 
these 489 applicants, 74% were accepted by the 1996 survey date, including those 
accepted on appeal or reapplication. Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics 
on the labor market, demographic and health characteristics of the male disabil-
ity applicants. The earnings and labor force participation rates of disability appli-
cants decline sharply over the 10 years preceding application. Throughout this 
period, average earnings drop by nearly $6400 (or 28.6%) and labor force partici-
pation drops 12.4 percentage points (or 14.9%).11 
8. They also look at the health characteristics of their sample. However, for the most part, their health 
information is self-reported with the disability application. 
9. Approximately 85% of the overall HRS sample consented to this matching. 
10. Also, another 145 have applications prior to 1992, but are excluded from the sample because the 
exact year of application is not observed.      
11. Note that all earnings are in 1999 dollars. 
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Table 3 breaks down these summary statistics separately for denied and ac-
cepted applicants. As in Bound (1989) and Chen and van der Klaauw (2008), 
we find that few denied disability applicants are in the labor force at the time 
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of male disability applicants 
                                                                                           N                         Percent 
1996 LFPa  489  9.2 
Accepted by 1996  362  74.0 
Race 
White  306  62.6 
Black  127  26.0 
Hispanic  49  10.0 
Other  7  1.4 
Education 
Less than HS  229  46.8 
HS Grad or GED  221  45.2 
Assoc. Degree  9  1.8 
Bachelors Degree  21  4.3 
Professional Degree  9   1.8 
Age at Application (Average Age = 48) 
30 or Younger  16  3.3 
31–40  52  10.6 
41–50  155  31.7 
51–60  235  48.1 
61 & Up  31  6.3 
Health 
Cancers & tumors; skin conditions  19  3.9 
Musculoskeletal system & connective tissue  221  45.2 
Heart, circulatory & blood conditions  213  43.6 
Respiratory system conditions  63  12.9 
Endocrine, metabolic & nutritional  48  9.8 
Digestive system  34  7.0 
Neurological & sensory  48  9.8 
Reproductive system & prostate  1  0.2 
Emotional & psychological  27  5.5 
Miscellaneous  24  4.9 
Other symptoms  7  1.4 
a. This is the self-reported labor force participation rate from the 1996 HRS. Note that 57% 
of males with no application reported being in the labor force
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of the survey; just 22.4% of denied applicants report working.12 For accepted ap-
plicants, the number is 4.6%.13 While whites apply for benefits at a much lower 
rate than blacks and Hispanics, they also have lower acceptance rates than these 
other groups. 78.6% of applicants with a less than high school education are ac-
cepted, the highest rate of any education group. Those ages 31–40 are the most 
likely to be accepted at 86.5%. Accepted applicants are much more likely than de-
nied applicants to have heart, circulatory, or blood conditions, but many of the 
other health conditions have similar acceptance rates. 
Estimation 
In this section, the year of application is used as a reference point for examin-
ing the behavior of rejected and accepted applicants for the 10 years leading up to 
application. Both labor force participation rates and earnings are examined: first 
by a raw comparison of rejected and accepted applicants and then with an econo-
metric analysis, controlling for observed differences between the groups. 
Figures 1 and 2 present earnings and labor force participation rates for ac-
cepted and rejected applicants during the 10 years leading up to application with-
out any adjustments for observable health or demographic characteristics.14 The 
graphs show a substantial reduction in work activity by both rejected and ac-
cepted applicants as the application date approaches. They also suggest that re-
Table 2. Labor force activity of disability applicants the decade before application 
Years to Application         Average Earningsa                                   LFP Rateb 
10  22,211  83.4 
9  21,702  82.2 
8  22,379  82.5 
7  22,640  82.3 
6  22,086  80.3 
5  22,442  79.9 
4  21,531  79.7 
3  20,856  77.1 
2  18,729  77.5 
1  15,848  71.0 
a. Earnings are in 1999 dollars 
b. Anyone with positive earnings in a given year is considered in the labor force   
12. Recall that Bound’s sample spans the 1970s, whereas Chen and van der Klaauw use data for the 
1990s and data from von Wachter et al. (forthcoming) span from 1978 to 2004. 
13. By contrast, 57% of those without disability applications reporting being in the labor force. By 
1996, the primary respondent from each household is between age 55 and 65, so a number of people 
in this group are retired. 
14. Again, those with any labor earnings are considered in the labor force.  
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jected applicants have weaker labor force attachment in each of the years leading 
up to application. The overall drop from 10 years prior to application until 1 year 
to application is substantially larger for the rejected group. The drop in earnings 
is over $2100 more and the drop in labor force participation is twice as great. 
Table 3. Characteristics of denied and accepted disability applicants  
                                                                           N           Denied      Accepted   Acceptance  
                                                                                                                                  (pct)a             (pct)a            Ratec 
1996 LFPd  489  22.4  4.6 
Accepted by 1996  362    74.0 
Race 
White  306  67.7  60.8  71.9 
Black  127  23.6  26.8  76.4 
Hispanic  49  6.3  11.3  83.7 
Other  7  2.4  1.1  57.1 
Education 
Less than HS  229  38.6  49.7  78.6 
HS Grad or GED  221  48.0  44.2  72.4 
Assoc. Degree  9  2.4  1.7  66.7 
Bachelor’s Degree  21  6.3  3.6  61.9 
Professional Degree  9  4.7  0.8  33.3 
Age at Application 
30 or Younger  16  3.2  3.3  75 
31–40  52  5.5  12.4  86.5 
41–50  155  27.6  33.2  77.4 
51–60  235  54.3  45.9  70.6 
61 & Up  31  9.5  5.3  61.3 
Health 
Cancers & tumors; skin conditions  19  3.4  2.5  68.4 
Musculoskeletal system  221  34.6  30.2  71.9  
      & connective tissue 
Heart, circulatory & blood conditions  213  25.1  31.9  78.9 
Respiratory system conditions  63  10.1  8.6  71.4 
Endocrine, metabolic & nutritional  48  8.4  6.3  68.8 
Digestive system  34  5.0  4.8  73.5 
Neurological & sensory  48  5.6  7.2  79.2 
Reproductive system & prostate  1  0.0  0.2  100.0 
Emotional & psychological  27  2.8  4.2  81.5 
Miscellaneous  24  3.4  3.4  75.0 
Other symptoms  7  1.7  0.8  57.1 
a. This column reports the percent of each category with a given characteristic. (For exam-
ple, of denied applicants, the percentage who are white.) 
b. The sample here is smaller because a number of applicants do not report a date of 
application 
c. Including those accepted on appeal or re-application 
d. 57% of males with no application reported being in the labor force    
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While there are clear labor market behavior differences between the two 
groups, we want to know how much of these differences can be accounted for 
by observable differences in demographic and health characteristics between 
accepted and rejected applicants. It may be that work behavior correlated with 
Figure 1. Male labor force participation rates in the years leading to disability application. 
1. Calculations are not conditioned on health or demographic characteristics. 2. Individu-
als with more than $100 in earnings are considered in the labor force. 3. Authors’ calcula-
tions based on HRS data. 
Figure 2. Male earnings in the years leading to disability application. 1. Calculations are 
not conditioned on health or demographic characteristics. 2. Authors’ calculations based 
on HRS data.  
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these demographic variables is responsible for the observed differences between 
rejected applicants and beneficiaries. Because the type of impairment one ac-
quires is also related to the nature of his job, the group differences may simply 
reflect the disproportionate rejection rate associated with certain impairments. 
Unfortunately, our health information is reported in the first (1992) wave of the 
HRS, while our earnings records span the 1980s. Thus, this health information is 
time-invariant. While contemporaneous health measures would be preferable, it 
is likely that there is strong positive correlation between ex post reported health 
conditions and contemporaneous measures. However, it remains unknown 
whether this is in fact the case.  
 To explore these possibilities, a regression analysis is performed. The model 
we estimate is: 
                Labor Force Activityi,t = α + δ Rejected Applicanti 
+ Year to Application Dummiesi,t + Χi β + εi,t       (1) 
where Labor Force Activityi,t is a measure of person i’s work behavior t years be-
fore his disability application. Rejected Applicanti  is an indicator for whether the 
individual’s application for disability benefits was denied by the SSA. Year to Ap-
plication Dummiesi,t is a series of indicators for how many years before disability 
application we are observing the individual’s work behavior. Xi is a vector of the 
individual’s demographic and health characteristics listed in Table 3, and εi,t is an 
error term. The coefficient of interest in this model is δ, which measures whether 
rejected disability applicants have different average labor market experiences 
over the 10 years before application than accepted applicants. 
The results of the estimation of this model are reported in Table 4. In column 
(1), the measure of labor force behavior is an indicator for whether the individual 
worked in the year; no demographic or health controls are included in this speci-
fication. The coefficient on the rejection indicator is negative and statistically dif-
ferent from zero at usual levels of significance. Its magnitude suggests that re-
jected applicants are on average about 8.5 percentage points less likely to be in 
the labor force in the 10 years leading up to disability application compared to 
accepted applicants. Because on average about 79.6% of disability applicants are 
working in a year during the decade before application, the coefficient implies 
that rejected applicants are about 10.7% less likely to be in the labor force than ac-
cepted applicants. 
In column (2) of Table 4, we present the results of the same regression speci-
fication except that we now include the demographic and health controls in the 
model. The coefficient on the rejection indicator slightly grows in absolute value 
and is again statistically different from zero. In this model, rejected applicants are 
about 9 percentage points (about 11.2%) less likely than accepted applicants to be 
in the labor force. 
The next two columns of Table 4 display the estimation of Equation (1) with 
the individual’s annual labor earnings as the dependent variable. Column (3) 
shows the results with no demographic and health controls in the model. The 
coefficient on the rejection indicator is negative, but it is imprecisely estimated. 
The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that rejected applicants earn on aver-
age about $2100 less per year than accepted applicants during the decade before 
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application. Average yearly earnings of accepted disability applicants during this 
period is about $21,600, implying that rejected applicants earnings are about 9.7% 
lower than beneficiaries before application. 
When demographic and (ex post) health controls are added to the model in col-
umn (4) of Table 4, the effect of the rejection indicator strengthens. The coefficient 
is almost twice as large and is statistically different from zero. The magnitude of 
the coefficient implies that rejected applicants earn almost $4000 per year less on 
average (18.5%) than accepted applicants during the decade before application. 
The results of the estimation of Equation (1) indicate significant level differ-
ences in the labor force activity of rejected and accepted disability applicants dur-
ing the decade before application. Rejected applicants are less likely to be in the 
labor force and earn less. Now, we examine whether there is a divergence in the 
Table 4. Level effect regression results for male applicants 
                                                                    LFP                                                   Earnings 
                                              No Controls        With Controlsa          No Controls     With Controlsa  
                                                      (1)                            (2)                          (3)                        (4) 
Rejection Indicator  −0.0841c  −0.0913c  −2114.25  −3930.37c 
 (0.033)  (0.0329)  (1691.70)  (1572.44) 
9 year to Application  −0.0118  −0.0067  −511.495  −470.28 
 (0.013)  (0.0137)  (382.11)  (386.43) 
8 year to Application  −0.0089  −0.0029  167.9876  −3.41573 
 (0.015)  (0.0161)  (492.10)  (527.51) 
7 year to Application  −0.0105  0.0015  431.4856  94.78838 
 (0.016)  (0.0179)  (503.99)  (588.60) 
6 year to Application  −0.0307  −0.0140  −123.247  −613.63 
 (0.016)  (0.0185)  (538.05)  (681.17) 
5 year to Application  −0.0348  −0.0147  232.2968  −320.866 
 (0.018)  (0.0213)  (608.36)  (810.78) 
4 year to Application  −0.0368  −0.0149  −677.97  −1453.69 
 (0.019)  (0.0234)  (657.05)  (928.69) 
3 year to Application  −0.0630c  −0.0412  −1354.36b  −2346.94c 
 (0.020)  (0.0260)  (695.80)  (1053.45) 
2 year to Application  −0.0589c  −0.0449  −3481.51c  −4668.91c 
 (0.021)  (0.0299)  (724.59)  (1186.70) 
1 year to Application  −0.1244c  −0.1195c  −6362.52c  −7852.25c 
 (0.023)  (0.0338)  (776.45)  (1334.82) 
Constant  0.8558c  0.9255  22759.62c  1131.831 
 (0.019)  (0.7688)  (867.45)  (20829.13) 
a. Year dummies, as well as demographic and health variables were also included in this run 
b. Statistically significant at the 10% level 
c. Statistically significant at the 5% level 
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labor market activity of rejected applicants compared to accepted applicants dur-
ing this time period. The estimating equation is now: 
    Labor Force Activityi,t = α + δ Rejected Applicanti + φ Rejected Applicanti
× (–Years to Applicationi,t) + Year to Application Dummiesi,t + Χi β + εi,t       (2) 
where –Years to Applicationi,t is the negative of the number of years until the indi-
vidual applies for disability benefits, and the other variables are defined as be-
fore. In this model, φ is the coefficient of interest, which measures whether there 
is a linear time trend (i.e., divergence) in the labor force activity of rejected appli-
cants compared to accepted applicants before application.  
The results of the estimation of Equation (2) are presented in Table 5. The de-
pendent variable for the first two columns is a dummy variable that equals one 
if the individual is in the labor force. In column (1), no demographic or health 
controls are included. The estimated coefficient on the rejection indicator is again 
large, negative and statistically different from zero. However, the coefficient on 
the interaction term is negative but imprecisely estimated. 
When demographic and health controls are added in column (2), the coeffi-
cient on the interaction term increases in absolute value and is now statistically 
significant from zero. The coefficient implies just over a 1-percentage point (or 
1.3%) per year divergence of labor force participation rates between accepted and 
rejected applicants as the application date approaches. (This is in addition to the 
level differences between the groups.) 
The next two columns of Table 5 display the estimation of Equation (2) with 
annual labor earnings as the dependent variable. Column (3) shows the results 
with no demographic and health controls. The coefficient on the interaction term 
is negative but not statistically significant from zero. The coefficient implies that 
rejected applicant earnings fall by $278 (or about 1.2%) more than accepted earn-
ings in each of the 10 years preceding application. Including demographic and 
health controls in column (4) yields similar results. This specification implies that 
rejected earnings fall by about $264 more than accepted in each of the years prior 
to application. Also for this specification, the rejection indicator is large in abso-
lute value. The coefficient suggests a level difference between the two groups of 
nearly $5400. 
One possible explanation for the differences in the measured labor market be-
havior between accepted and rejected disability applicants could be due to a dis-
proportionate share of SSI applicants among the rejected group. Because those 
qualifying for SSI generally have weak labor force attachment and low earn-
ings, if SSI applicants are more likely to be rejected than DI applicants, then our 
observed differences in labor market behavior across groups might be only be-
cause of this composition effect. To control for this potential problem, our previ-
ous analysis is re-estimated using only those with strong attachments to the labor 
force well before application in the regression sample, all of whom are likely to 
have applied for DI.15 
 15. A simpler solution would be to look separately at SSI and DI applicants, but the HRS often does 
not distinguish between applications to the two programs (or if applications were filed for both 
programs). 
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Individuals with less than $10,000 per year in real earnings 7 years prior to ap-
plication are dropped.16 This reduces the sample size to 315 accepted (of which 
253 report an application date) and 157 rejected (of which 75 report an applica-
tion date). The regression analysis is repeated with this sub-sample. Now we only 
examine the earnings and labor force participation decisions of applicants during 
the 6 years before application. A similar pattern emerges, but this time, especially 
when examining labor force participation, the evidence of divergence over time 
between accepted and rejected applicants is much stronger. This suggests that the 
earlier results were not driven by a disproportionate presence of SSI applicants 
among the rejected group. 
Table 5. Interacted regression results for male applicants 
                                                              LFP                                                            Earnings 
                                            No Controls     With Controlsa                         No Controls        With Controlsa  
                                                      (1)                         (2)                                     (3)                            (4) 
Rejection Indicator  −0.1231d  −0.1482d  −3641.6c  −5387.2d 
 (0.0461)  (0.0471)  (2077.4)  (2036.7) 
Interactionb  −0.0071  −0.0103c  −278.4  −263.9 
 (0.0055)  (0.0055)  (213.9)  (217.2) 
9 year to Application  −0.0099  −0.0037  −438.3  −394.0 
 (0.0135)  (0.0137)  (386.7)  (389.8) 
8 year to Application  −0.0052  0.0028  312.4  142.7 
 (0.0158)  (0.0164)  (503.9)  (539.2) 
7 year to Application  −0.0050  0.0099  647.5  312.1 
 (0.0170)  (0.0186)  (526.6)  (605.7) 
6 year to Application  −0.0233  −0.0028  165.4  −326.6 
 (0.0172)  (0.0192)  (557.4)  (693.8) 
5 year to Application  −0.0256  −0.0007  593.4  37.6 
 (0.0192)  (0.0218)  (635.9)  (828.7) 
4 year to Application  −0.0258  0.0017  −244.4  −1028.4 
 (0.0206)  (0.0245)  (707.8)  (965.9) 
3 year to Application  −0.0501d  −0.0224  −848.7  −1864.7c 
 (0.0224)  (0.0273)  (745.9)  (1083.0) 
2 year to Application  −0.0442c  −0.0242  −2903.6d  −4138.3d 
 (0.0233)  (0.0310)  (813.9)  (1227.7) 
1 year to Application  −0.1078d  −0.0978d  −5712.3d  −7297.5c 
 (0.0256)  (0.0347)  (883.4)  (1370.9) 
Constant  0.8475d  0.9038  22433.8d  575.5d 
 (0.0195)  (0.7639)  (889.6)  (20792.4) 
a. Year dummies, as well as demographic and health variables were included in this run 
b. Rejection dummy multiplied by the observation year less the application year 
c. Statistically significant at the 10% level 
d. Statistically significant at the 5% level 
16. A similar analysis was also tried keeping only those with $10,000 or more in earnings for the seven 
through 10 years prior to application. This analysis yielded similar results.  
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Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 report the labor force participation results. The 
interaction coefficient as well as the rejection indicator are negative and are statis-
tically different from zero (for both the specification with and without health and 
demographic controls). The estimates are much larger in absolute value than the 
estimates from the unrestricted sample in Table 5. With health and demographic 
controls, the coefficient on the interacted term implies an over 2.8 percentage 
point (or 3.4%) per year divergence between accepted and rejected applicants, 
as the application date approaches. (This is in addition to an over 20-percentage 
point (nearly 25%) level difference between the groups.) 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 present the results for the earnings regressions 
with the restricted sample. As with labor force participation, the earnings results 
are now much larger in absolute value; however, as with the full sample, the co-
efficients on the interaction terms are still imprecisely estimated. With health and 
demographic controls, the interacted coefficient implies a divergence of over $600 
(or 2.9%) for each of the 6 years prior to application. Also with the controls, the 
coefficient on the rejection dummy is large in absolute value and shows strong 
statistical significance. It suggests a close to $5700 (or over 27%) level difference 
between the groups.  
Table 6. Restricted sample regression results (with interactions) for male applicants 
                                                                   LFP                                                          Earnings 
                                            No Controls           With Controls              No Controls        With Controls
                                                       (1)                              (2)                                (3)                         (4) 
Rejection Indicator  −0.1761e  −0.2032e  −3110.31  −5681.7e 
 (0.0605)  (0.0612)  (2956.13)  (2875.5) 
Interactionc  −0.0241e  −0.0282e  −666.21  −617.0 
 (0.0106)  (0.0106)  (474.63)  (498.8) 
5 year to Application  −0.0282e  −0.0275e  −302.77  −550.0 
 (0.0136)  (0.0137)  (523.11)  (546.0) 
4 year to Application  −0.0472e  −0.0459e  −1600.20  −2332.1e 
 (0.0153)  (0.0165)  (678.06)  (755.5) 
3 year to Application  −0.0537e  −0.060e  −2361.47e  −3575.4e 
 (0.0185)  (0.0209)  (796.15)  (933.3) 
2 year to Application  −0.0849e  −0.0991e  −5296.00e  −6792.3e 
 (0.0198)  (0.0237)  (935.60)  (1146.7) 
1 year to Application  −0.1344e  −0.1534e  −8892.20e  −10914.2e 
 (0.0229)  (0.0278)  (1092.89)  (1389.8) 
Constant  0.9918  1.0649  31131.54e  36730.1 
 (0.0084)  (1.0033)  (935.95)  (46924.2) 
a. Those with $10,000 or more earnings 7 years prior to application 
b. Year dummies, as well as demographic and health variables were included in this run 
c. Rejection dummy multiplied by the observation year less the application year 
d. Statistically significant at the 10% level 
e. Statistically significant at the 5% level
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Conclusion 
Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income caseloads have in-
creased rapidly in the United States over the past 30 years. The rapid growth of 
these federal disability programs has been criticized on the grounds that imper-
fect targeting causes able individuals to use the programs to subsidize early re-
tirement. This criticism has given rise to a large literature on the effects of dis-
ability benefits on labor force participation; however, there has been little work 
analyzing how the disability screening process actually separates applicants. 
Our results suggest that rejected and accepted disability applicants have dif-
ferent labor market experiences in the years prior to application. Rejected appli-
cants are less likely to be in the labor force and earn less than beneficiaries dur-
ing the decade before application. There is some evidence that these differences 
grow larger as the date of application approaches, especially for applicants with 
a past strong labor market attachment who are most likely to have applied for 
DI. The data clearly show that denied applicants are likely to experience more 
pronounced declines in earnings and labor force participation before application 
than beneficiaries. 
There is considerable evidence from other work that people’s economic cir-
cumstances affect the decision whether or not they apply for disability benefits. 
Studies such as von Wachter et al. (forthcoming), Duggan and Imberman (2008), 
Autor and Duggan (2003) and Black et al. (2002) find that those who have expe-
rienced adverse wage and employment shocks are more likely to apply for ben-
efits. Our work indicates that these applicants are less likely to survive the SSA 
screening process. 
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